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The Earned Income Tax 
Credit, Welfare Reform, 
and the Employment of 
Low-Skilled Single Mothers
Hilary Williamson Hoynes
University of California, Davis
Cash assistance for low-income families with children underwent 
tremendous change in the 1990s. Welfare reform led to a dramatic 
reduction in the generosity of state cash assistance and an elimination 
of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. At 
the same time, cash assistance through the tax system, in the form of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), increased substantially. In fact, the 
EITC is now the largest federal cash transfer program for lower-income 
families, generating a total cost (in 2005) of $34 billion, compared 
with $24 billion in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
expenditures.
This shift in the structure of cash assistance for low-income fami-
lies, away from welfare and toward tax-based assistance, is the outcome 
of a long-standing criticism that traditional welfare programs generate 
adverse incentives for work and family. Importantly, the policy changes 
to welfare and the EITC in the 1990s both provided incentives (finan-
cial and otherwise) for single mothers with children to increase their 
employment. Indeed, employment rates of single mothers with children 
rose 11 percentage points over a 20-year period, from 73 percent in 
1987 to 84 percent in 2006. Even more striking is the 16-percentage- 
point change (from 72 to 88 percent) that occurred between 1992 and 
1999. During this span, gains were even larger for single mothers 
without a high school diploma; among this group, employment rates 
increased by 20 percentage points between 1992 and 1999. No other 
group of women (single women without children, married women with 
62   Hoynes
or without children) or men experienced such a dramatic increase in 
employment. In this chapter, I describe these important policies, as well 
as present trends in employment for single mothers, and I summarize 
what is known about how the changes in welfare and the EITC have 
affected employment.
WELFARE REFORM AND THE EARNED INCOME  
TAX CREDIT
The AFDC program provided cash assistance to low-income single 
mothers with children from the 1930s to the 1990s. The program was 
designed to provide an income transfer for needy families in an era 
when women with children had minimal labor-market attachment. Con-
sequently, AFDC benefits were phased out at a very high rate: after a 
small disregard, benefits were reduced by one dollar for every addi-
tional dollar in earned income. This, by design, created a targeting of 
benefits to those with the lowest income levels, but it also inadvertently 
created a disincentive to enter the labor force because the increase in 
earnings was offset by a reduction in the cash transfer. 
Concerns about the labor supply disincentives in the AFDC pro-
gram had an important impact on welfare reform at the state and federal 
level. Beginning in the early 1990s, many states were granted waivers 
to change their AFDC programs, and by 1995 about half of the states 
had implemented some sort of welfare waiver. On the heels of this 
state experimentation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was enacted in 1996, replacing 
AFDC with TANF. The key elements of reform in the state waivers 
and TANF legislation include work requirements, lifetime time limits, 
financial sanctions, and enhanced earnings disregards. These changes 
were designed to increase work and reduce welfare participation. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows the dramatic decline in welfare caseloads that occurred 
during this period. 
The EITC began in 1975 as a modest program aimed at offsetting 
Social Security payroll taxes for low-income families with children. It 
was the outcome of a vigorous policy debate surrounding the efficacy of 
a negative income tax (NIT) as a means of reducing poverty. The con-
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cern was that the NIT would discourage labor market activity as it was 
gradually phased out. Ultimately the EITC was born out of a desire to 
reward work. The EITC provides a cash transfer to low-income work-
ing families through the tax system. The EITC is refundable so that a 
taxpayer with no federal tax liability, for example, would receive a tax 
refund from the government for the full amount of the credit. Eligibil-
ity for the credit requires one to have positive earned income and also 
requires one’s adjusted gross income and earned income to be below a 
specified amount; in 2007, the maximum allowable income for a sin-
gle taxpayer with one child was $33,241 ($37,783 with two or more 
children).1 
The amount of the credit to which a taxpayer is entitled depends on 
the taxpayer’s earned income, adjusted gross income, and, since 1991, 
the number of EITC-eligible children in the household. There are three 
regions in the credit schedule: the phase-in region, the flat region, and 
the phase-out region. The credit for those in the phase-in region is equal 
to the subsidy rate times their earnings. The subsidy rate is quite high—
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34 percent for taxpayers with one child and 40 percent for taxpayers 
with two or more children. In the flat region, the family receives the 
maximum credit (in 2007 it was $2,853 for one child and $4,716 for 
more), whereas in the phase-out region the credit is discontinued at the 
phase-out rate (16 and 21 percent). As shown in Figure 4.2, the program 
expanded under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993 (OBRA90 and OBRA93). Figure 
4.2 illustrates these expansions in the program by plotting the (real) 
EITC payment schedule by (real) earnings for selected years between 
1984 and 2006, separately for families with one child (Panel A) and for 
those with two or more children (Panel B).2 The figure clearly shows 
that not only was the 1993 expansion the largest of the three but that it 
was much larger for families with two or more children. For example, 
between 1993 and 2006, single mothers with two children and earning 
between $15,000 and $25,000 (in 2006 dollars) experienced a more-
than-doubling of their real transfer from the EITC. In contrast, single 
mothers with one child and earning $15,000 (in real 2006 dollars) expe-
rienced about a 40 percent increase in the real EITC, while those earn-
ing $25,000 experienced about a 25 percent increase in the real EITC. 
These expansions have led to a dramatic increase in the total cost of 
the EITC in recent years. Figure 4.3 plots the number of EITC recipi-
ents (taxpaying units or families) and the total tax cost of the EITC (in 
2006 dollars) over the period from 1975 to 2005. The figure clearly 
shows the rising expenditures and number of recipients associated with 
the 1986, 1990, and 1993 tax acts. Importantly, between 1990 and 1996, 
real EITC costs increased more than threefold.3 
Finally, Figure 4.4 contrasts the aggregate cost of the EITC with 
the cost of AFDC/TANF from 1975 to 2005. In a very short time, the 
EITC has overtaken AFDC/TANF and become the largest cash transfer 
program for low-income families.
POLICY CHANGES AND EXPECTED IMPACTS  
ON EMPLOYMENT
Labor supply theory suggests that welfare reform and EITC expan-
sions should increase employment of low-income single mothers.4 Vir-
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SOURCE: AFDC/TANF expenditures from Office of Management and Budget (2007). 
EITC expenditures from Tax Policy Center (2007).
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tually all of the provisions implemented in the state and federal welfare 
reform should lead to more employment through removing the entitle-
ment nature of welfare (time limits), increasing the costs of participa-
tion in welfare (work requirements, financial sanctions), and reducing 
the financial work disincentives (reducing the phase-out rate, increasing 
work disregards).
The expansions in the EITC also are expected to lead to more 
employment among single mothers. Because the EITC is available only 
to taxpayers with earned income, standard labor supply theory predicts 
that the EITC will encourage labor force participation. While this effect 
is not the focus of this paper, the EITC is expected to reduce hours 
worked for those women already working whose earnings are in the flat 
and phase-out regions of the credit.5 
TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT OF SINGLE MOTHERS
Figure 4.5 presents annual employment rates for women aged 19–
44 between 1983 and 2006.6 We show the employment rates for four 
groups: 1) single women with children, 2) single women without chil-
dren, 3) married women with children, and 4) married women without 
children. These groups are chosen to illustrate the dramatic changes 
particular to single women with children—the group most affected by 
welfare reform and the EITC.
The figure shows the dramatic increase in employment rates for 
single women with children during this period. For example, between 
1983 and 2006 employment rates of single mothers increased by 13 per-
centage points—from 71 percent in 1983 to 84 percent in 2006. Most of 
this change occurred between 1992 and 1999, when employment rates 
increased by an amazing 16 percentage points (from 72 to 88 percent). 
This coincided with the largest expansion in the history of the EITC 
and the dramatic reform of the welfare system. Of course, not all the 
gains can be attributed to the EITC’s growth and welfare reform; they 
also happened during the strong 1990s economic expansion—a time of 
rising wages and falling unemployment rates. However, it is clear from 
this simple figure that the gains in employment experienced by single 
mothers were not shared by all demographic groups.
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To refine the analysis, and recognizing that EITC recipients are 
more likely to have lower skill and education levels, Figure 4.6 pres-
ents the annual employment rates when limiting the sample to women 
with 12 or fewer years of education. While employment rates are lower 
among less-educated women, the same pattern is evident—large gains 
in employment for single mothers over the period, as shown by a tre-
mendous increase of 20 percentage points between 1992 and 1999.
The last figure, Figure 4.7, shows the employment rates for single 
women by number of children (none, one, or two or more). Breaking 
down the data in this way reveals that the increases in employment were 
concentrated among single women with two or more children.
Figure 4.5  Annual Employment Rates for Women Aged 19–44, by 


























SOURCE: Author’s tabulation of the 1984–2007 March Current Population Surveys.
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Figure 4.6  Annual Employment Rates for Women Aged 19–44 with a High 



























SOURCE: Author’s tabulation of the 1984–2007 March Current Population Surveys.


























SOURCE: Author’s tabulation of the 1984–2007 March Current Population Surveys.
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DID WELFARE REFORM AND THE EITC CONTRIBUTE TO 
THE INCREASES IN EMPLOYMENT?
Separately identifying the impact of welfare reform, the EITC, and 
the strong economy on single women is a challenge, as the three fac-
tors were all at play in the mid- to late 1990s. The literature on the 
subject documents many approaches that have been taken in an attempt 
to disentangle the impacts. One approach is to take advantage of the 
variation across states in welfare reform, the business cycle, and the 
state EITCs. A second approach uses comparison groups. Yet anoth-
er approach parameterizes the gains to work and utilizes variation in 
gains to work for women over time, across states, and in different skill 
groups. From all of these approaches, there is strong evidence that wel-
fare reform, the EITC, and the strong economy all played a role in the 
rising employment rates experienced by single mothers in the 1990s. 
This section provides a brief summary of the large literature on the 
impact that the EITC and welfare reform have had on the labor supply 
of single mothers.7 
Much of the work in this area concentrates on the impact of either 
welfare reform or the EITC. In the EITC literature, the studies suggest 
a strong positive relationship between the EITC and employment rates 
of single women with children. Furthermore, the results are remarkably 
consistent across different policy expansions, different control groups, 
and different methodologies. Several studies (Ellwood 2000; Rothstein 
2005; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000) find that groups with the most to 
gain from EITC expansions (e.g., single women and women with lower 
wages, lower education levels, and more children) experienced larger 
gains in employment rates. The welfare reform studies also find posi-
tive impacts on employment, with magnitudes somewhat smaller and 
less statistically significant than those of the EITC studies.
Few studies provide a direct comparison of welfare reform and the 
EITC. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) is an important exception. Their 
analysis examines the impact of taxes, welfare generosity, welfare 
reform, other policies (minimum wages, in-kind transfer programs), and 
demographics on the employment of single mothers. They find that of 
the 12-percentage-point increase in employment rates of single mothers 
between 1984 and 1996, fully 60 percent of the increase was attribut-
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able to the EITC and other tax changes, and 15 percent was attribut-
able to welfare reform. The results on the relative importance of EITC 
versus welfare reform are sensitive to the particular time period ana-
lyzed. For the period from 1992 to 1996, however, Meyer and Rosen-
baum find that the importance of welfare reform rose relative to that of 
the EITC—specifically, 35 percent of the increase in employment was 
linked to the EITC and other tax changes, and 20 percent was linked to 
welfare reform.
CONCLUSION
The 1990s were a period of tremendous change in policies affecting 
single mothers with children. The expansion of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit and welfare reform both raised the financial rewards to welfare 
recipients for moving into the labor force. Furthermore, the gains in 
employment for single mothers during this period were sizable, and no 
such gains were experienced by other groups of workers. There is an 
extensive body of research that looks at these facts and, using a wide 
variety of methodologies, concludes that these changes in taxes and 
transfers contributed in an important way to these increases in employ-
ment. The research suggests that the expansions in the EITC were the 
most important contributor to these changes. 
Notes
This chapter was originally a paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Conference on “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers,” November 
15–16, 2007.
 1. There is also a small credit for childless taxpayers. We ignore that here and focus 
on the main recipients, families with children.
  2. Figure 4.2 plots the EITC schedule that applies to single taxpayers. Beginning 
in 2002, the flat and phaseout regions were expanded modestly (by $1,000 from 
2002 to 2004, by $2,000 from 2005 to 2007, and by $3,000 from 2008 onwards) 
for married filers.
  3. In addition to the federal EITC, an increasing number of states offer state EITCs. 
As of 2004, a total of 18 states had introduced state EITCs that supplement the 
72   Hoynes
federal credit. Almost all states structure their credits as a share of the federal 
credit, ranging between 5 percent (Illinois) and more than 40 percent (Minnesota 
and Wisconsin), and almost all make the credit refundable like the federal credit 
(Llobrera and Zahradnik 2004).
  4. The focus in this chapter is on single mothers, who represent the vast majority of 
AFDC/TANF recipients and over 75 percent of EITC claims (Eissa and Hoynes 
2006a). The labor supply impacts of the EITC expansion on married couples are 
more complicated and are likely to lead to reductions in employment for some 
married women (Eissa and Hoynes 2004, 2006a,b).
  5. In the phase-in region, the EITC has an ambiguous impact on hours worked 
because of the negative income effect and positive substitution effect. In the flat 
region, the EITC produces a negative income effect, leading to an unambiguous 
reduction in hours worked. In the phase-out region, the EITC produces a negative 
income and negative substitution effect, leading again to an unambiguous reduc-
tion in hours worked. Eissa and Hoynes (2006a) show that about three-quarters 
of single EITC recipients have earnings in the flat and phase-out regions of the 
credit—thus, the expectation is that the EITC will reduce the number of hours 
worked by most eligible single taxpayers already in the labor force.
  6. These tabulations are calculated using the 1984–2007 March Current Population 
Surveys. The sample includes all women aged 19–44 who are not in school or 
disabled. We also drop the relatively small number of women who report working 
positive hours but have zero earnings or report positive earnings but zero hours. 
For these calculations, employment is defined as any work done over the previous 
calendar year.
 7. Individual papers are cited where particularly relevant. The interested reader 
should consult the recent and comprehensive reviews of this literature by Blank 
(2002), Eissa and Hoynes (2006a), Grogger and Karoly (2005), and Hotz and 
Scholz (2003).
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